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The
Road to Safety
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2001-2005 |
Setting the scene: The Statistics, the Safety Problem, the Key Contributory
Factors
Vital Statistics: South African Road Use
There are currently about 6 million licensed drivers and about 6,73 million
licensed and registered vehicles on South Africa’s roads. This figure is made
up of:
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3,86 million sedan cars [57.36%].
-
252 000 minibuses - of which some 126 000 operate as minibus taxis
[3.75%].
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24 000 buses [0.36%].
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227 000 motorised heavy freight vehicles [3.37%].
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1,2 million light delivery vehicles (bakkies) [17.83%].
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1,17 million other (trailers, including truck trailers, motorcycles,
special vehicles, etc) [17.38%].
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The total road and street network is approximately 500 000 km in length.
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The annual vehicle/km travelled on SA roads is estimated at about 98 000
million - or 268m km a day - of which 153m is travelled daily on the rural
road network (including inter-city national roads).
-
Keeping all this traffic moving are fuel sales of about 9500 megalitres a
year.
The Safety Problem: the Overall Picture
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There are currently about 512 000 traffic crashes a year [511 605 in
1998].
-
Of these, about 28 000 are fatal or lead to serious injury [7 260 crashes
involving fatalities, 21 265 involving serious injuries in 1998].
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In 1998, 9 086 people lost their lives on SA roads, while 36 246 were
seriously and 84 358 slightly injured.
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The total cost of these crashes to the SA economy is currently estimated
at around R13.8 billion a year.
Calculating the cost of road crashes
We use a crash cost calculation model developed by the CSIR in 1991.
The model distinguishes between four major types of crash and calculates a
monetary value for each in terms of such features as damage to vehicles
and goods, loss of business, loss of earnings from fatalities, emergency
service costs and hospitalisation & rehabilitation costs.
The model, adjusted annually in line with the CPI, gives the following
average costs (Rand value, year 2000) for each type of crash:
- Fatal: R386 498.01
- Serious injury: R101 448.30
- Slight injury: R28 884.14
- Damage only: R20 421.56
The total figure of R13.8 billion for 2000 is arrived at by multiplying
the number of recorded accidents of each type by the cost index for that
crash type.
It hardly needs saying that no monetary value can be put on the social
cost of crashes in terms of lost human potential, the pain & suffering
of crash victims and the grief of bereaved families. |
The most recent finalised statistics on crash rates in South Africa (1998)
show a figure of 776 crashes per every 10,000 vehicles per annum—or 400
crashes per every 100 million vehicle kms travelled (as per the two main types
of International benchmark measurement).
In terms of the first benchmark, South Africa’s road fatality rate for 1998
was 13.73 per 10 000 vehicles.
Where does this put us in global terms? The statistics are sobering. In the
chart below we give a representative sample of international fatality rates per
10 000 vehicles for the latest year (1996) when such global figures were
available.

With the state of Victoria, Australia, registering 1.2 deaths per 10 000
vehicles and China registering 26, South Africa – despite the welcome drop
from 15.13 deaths per 10 000 vehicles in 1995 to 13.73 in 1998 – still falls
well to the "wrong side" of the mean. What emerges from this
comparison is that our performance puts us firmly in the "developing
world" category – ahead of China and India, but significantly behind
Turkey and Brazil (and roughly on a par with Russia). The scale of the problem
we face could not be clearer.
However, we need to keep a sense of historical proportion here. In the next
chart we offer a long-range retrospective view of fluctuations in the South
African road fatality rate (1935 – 1998).

From this chart, two facts immediately become evident. The first is that our
record has always been bad, though with significant downward "blips"
in the last years of World War Two (fuel shortages/less domestic travel) and in
1974 (compare with 1973) when, as a result of the global oil crisis, tight speed
restrictions were enforced on SA roads).
The second is that in recent years – and particularly since the launch of
Arrive Alive – we have witnessed what is starting to look like a significant
downward trend. The aim of The Road to Safety, in combination with an all-year
Arrive Alive programme, is to consolidate and accelerate this trend.
[Note: Arrive Alive is a multi-dimensional programme of enforcement,
coordination and communication. But the emphasis it places on speed limit
enforcement is set to intensify greatly over the life of this strategy. This
approach is grounded not only in the lessons of 1974, but in the results of
study after study conducted in developed, middle-income and developing
countries, all of which prove an incontestable correlation between speed (both
absolute and too high for the prevailing circumstances), insufficient reaction
time, crashes and fatalities. (See "The Speed Debate" below)].
Note:
The 1998 figure of 13.8 fatalities per 10 000 vehicles is the second
lowest in South Africa history, after the rate of 12.7 recorded in 1944.
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Driver/vehicle analysis
Having outlined the general picture, the next step is to focus on crash and
fatality trends for the different types of vehicles (and by implication their
drivers) using South African roads. This has for some time now given us the
information we need to serve as a rough indicator of the areas to which remedial
attention should urgently be directed. The next figure tells the basic story.

The most important pointers here are the following:
The sedan car is overwhelmingly the type of vehicle most often involved in
crashes. This is obviously partly due to the fact that these vehicles comprise
57% of the total vehicle population.
But, if we exclude the category of "other" vehicles from our
calculations (on the grounds that many of them are not regular users of public
roads) we arrive at a more realistic road usage share, which gives us a
reconfigured % of the (active, daily) vehicle population for each vehicle type.
This then allows us to more accurately represent their respective levels of
involvement in crashes, and so get a clearer idea of comparable driver/vehicle
behaviour between categories.
The picture that emerges looks like this:
|
Vehicle type |
% of Vehicle Population |
% Share in crashes |
|
Sedan car
Minibus
LDV
Heavy Truck
Bus |
69.38
4.52
21.57
4.08
0.43 |
67.02
8.62
17.51
5.68
1.15 |
In other words, we see heavy trucks, minibuses (including taxis), and buses
all scoring above their representation in the vehicle population – with trucks
scoring around 1½ times their weighting, minibuses scoring around double their
weighting and buses scoring at nearly 2¾ times their weighting.
Summing up:
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The high absolute number of vehicles involved in crashes represented in
the graphic at the foot of p.12 tells us that:
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The discrepancies between the different vehicle types in terms of their
relative rates of involvement in crashes indicates that the combination of
driver and vehicle unfitness is particularly acute in the heavy freight,
minibus taxi and bus sectors.
This drives us towards our strategic emphasis on the following key areas of
intervention:
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Further tightening up on-road enforcement of speed, alcohol limits and
vehicle overloading (Arrive Alive operational issues);
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Restructuring our inspectorates, cleaning up driving licence and
vehicle testing, formalising and regulating the driving school sector,
setting tougher professional driver qualification criteria and tightening
regulation of freight and public passenger fleet operators (system &
structure issues).
The need for these targeted interventions is further confirmed if we
examine trend-based data on both crash and fatality rates per vehicle type per
100 million vehicle kilometres travelled over the period 1991-1998. The
figures (see over) tell a mixed story.

LDVs’ rate of involvement in crashes is lower than the average for all
vehicles, and has shown a slight downward trend over the period.
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The crash rate for the category "all vehicles" has shown a
steady, if very gradual, downward trend over the period.
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The crash rates for heavy vehicles declined from 1991-93, rose from
1994-96 and began declining again in 1997-98.
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The crash rate for buses was constant at just below 600 crashes per 100
million vehicle kilometres travelled from 1991-93, and then began to show a
sharp upward trend, apparently peaking at about 950 in 1997. It is too early
to say whether the slight decline in 1998 represents the start of a reversal
in this trend or not.
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The crash rate for minibuses has been fairly constant at a high level of
about 900-1000 crashes per 100 million vehicle kilometres travelled (apart
from a peak of over 1200 in 1996). There is as yet no sign of any downward
trend emerging.
If we now turn to fatality rates for the same period, we see additional
patterns of unevenness.

This graphic tells us that:
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The fatality rate for the category "all vehicles" has
come down from 11.5 (1991) to 7 (1998) per 100 million vehicle kilometres.
This represents a significant downward trend, probably associated
with increasing seatbelt usage and gradual improvements in the safety
construction of new vehicles.
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The fatality rates for heavy vehicles and LDVs have
fluctuated slightly but are fairly constant with a very slight decline.
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[Note: the fatality rate for heavy vehicles indicated here is somewhat
misleading, since fatalities registered in crashes are based on vehicle occupants.
In crashes involving heavy freight vehicles, the rate of occupant deaths is
much lower than the rate of collateral deaths caused (persons in other
vehicles and pedestrians].
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The fatality rate for buses showed a constant and alarming upward trend
from 1991 to 1997 (from under 5 to 13 fatalities per 100 million vehicle
kilometres travelled), almost catching up with the fatality rate for minibus
taxis. It is too early to say whether the drop to 11 fatalities/100 vehicle
km registered in 1998 represents the start of a sustained decline or not.
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The fatality rate for minibuses has fluctuated at a consistently high
level of between about 15 and 20 fatalities/100 million vehicle km
travelled. There is no sign yet of any reversal in this trend.
Road crashes and deaths: the key contributory factors
Our research has regularly shown that the role played by each of the three
major factors involved in crashes can broadly be broken down as follows:
| Driver factors - |
80-90% |
| Vehicle factors - |
10-30% |
| Road environment factors - |
5-15% |
We therefore have to ensure from the start that the attention we pay to each
factor is proportionate to its significance for road safety and has the
potential to achieve the greatest impact over the medium to long term. Many of
the actions that appear in the list of short to medium term interventions (i.e.
actions which will be unrolled during the life of the strategy to 2005) are
"starter-actions" aimed at rebuilding eroded or historically
inadequate institutional foundations. They will not solve all the problems
instantly. But they will create a new basis for incremental strengthening of our
regulatory and enforcement systems over time.
Key driver factors
Speed
The "Speed Debate"
Arrive Alive continually drives home the simple message "Speed
kills!" There are those who dispute this statement, drawing attention to
issues such as the following:
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The general debate on speed does not properly distinguish between speed causing
a crash, and speed influencing injury severity once a crash occurs.
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Most road crashes occur in urban or peri-urban areas (i.e. at speeds
lower than average freeway speeds); and the crash rate on national roads is
significantly lower than in these areas;
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The relative speed of moving vehicles (hence force of impact) is a more
significant factor in the outcome of a crash than the absolute speed of a
single vehicle;
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Moving violations (speed too slow for circumstances, improper lane usage,
illegal turning, running red lights or stop signs etc.) are factors at least
equally salient in crashes as is absolute speed.
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On-road enforcement has traditionally devoted disproportionate attention
to "trapping" on open stretches of national roads and in small
towns (allegedly for "purely revenue raising" purposes);
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Local road environment and human density factors are an integral
component in the determination of what a safe speed is, and in the incidence
of actual crashes.
We recognise the validity of these points; so long as it is recognised that
they capture important aspects of the truth, not the whole truth. We stick to
the emphasis on the negative role of speed for very good reasons—and with the
following specific emphases:
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The most important issue is undoubtedly speed too high for prevailing
circumstances. This applies to both national and local roads. It does
not, however, invalidate the need to set speed limits. If you say that
"speed is not the issue" - and one assumes that this means on
national roads, not in built-up urban areas—where do you draw the line?
250 km/hr? An unrestricted autobahn approach to South African
national roads? Our national road environment is characterised by sudden
changes of width, surface quality, weather and visibility conditions, and is
further complicated by the widespread presence of pedestrians and stray
animals along both urban and rural roads. We must set limits that take
proper account of this complexity, and of road-user fallibility (both
drivers and pedestrians).
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International crash research over many years has led to a powerful
consensus on the relationship between absolute speed (as well as speed too
high for circumstances) and two other linked factors: driver information
overload (leading to impaired decision-making capacity) and (compounding
this) the reduction of available reaction time to allow for avoidance
of a potential crash situation. Crashes almost always have to do with the unexpected
(i.e. a sudden dramatic increase in the number of decision variables
confronting the driver). In such cases (typically arising at intersections
or along busy stretches of urban or national road) the driver’s
"reasonable" safety calculations, based on "normal"
driving conditions, cease to apply. The equation is simple: greater speed,
exponentially less available reaction time, more certainty of a crash, more
devastating impact. ("The faster you go, the harder you hit.")
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Absolute speed, being a critical factor determining the likelihood of
death and the severity of injuries sustained by occupants in single vehicle
or multiple vehicle collisions, is of major concern to us: for all road
users, but in particular for passengers in public transport vehicles (buses,
coaches and minibus taxis). The death and injury rates prevailing in these
sectors are absolutely unacceptable; the passengers are entirely innocent
parties; and the great majority of them are "captive" to these
modes of transport, without access to alternative options. Their rights
require special defence, in terms of speed limit enforcement, professional
driver competence and vehicle fitness assurance.
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Speeding is in many instances also related to a mind-set and behaviour
patterns that are selfish, aggressive and unconcerned with the safety of
other road users. It is often closely connected with the other forms of
moving violation that contribute to crashes. Changing these underlying
psychological/cultural factors is therefore a critical long term need,
particularly in the light of widespread negative driver attitudes that still
reflect live elements of South Africa’s violent, divided, highly
individualised past.
Speeding violations therefore must and will be enforced, with the following
proviso. Speed enforcement will pay—indeed is already paying—much greater
attention than in the past to data-driven targeting. This means concentrating
enforcement on identified rural, urban and peri-urban hazardous locations and
road stretches, at the times of week and hours of day and night during which our
statistics show the highest concentration of crashes occurring (including, of
course, pedestrian collisions).
We hope that the discussion above has made it clear that, while we will
continue to treat speed as a key safety issue, this does not mean that we
elevate it to a level of importance above all other factors. It should be
evident from what we have said that we explicitly recognise the importance of
all the other factors at work—driver, vehicle and environment-related—and
you will see that the whole thrust of this strategy is to develop interventions
in each key area of road safety that will be both locally effective and mutually
reinforcing from an overall systems perspective.
Other driver factors, which to a greater or lesser degree contribute to
crashes, include:
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Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (continuously targeted
by Arrive Alive) and/or a drug having a narcotic effect. (Testing
will be stepped up during the life of this strategy, as accurate evidentiary
technologies are introduced—see box);
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Fatigue resulting from exceeding the maximum acceptable uninterrupted
driving hours (regularly targeted by Arrive Alive communication
campaigns, and currently under negotiation with the road freight and public
passenger transport sectors in the context of regulation of professional
driver working hours and conditions – see Operator Fitness below);
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Basic driver incompetence (driving without proper training, without a
licence or with a forged or fraudulently issued licence).
Note: The issue of basic driver incompetence moves to a very high priority
position in this strategy, since our research into recurring patterns of driver
error in crashes points to a clear causal relation between such error and the
low levels of skill and awareness prevailing amongst thousands of drivers on
South Africa’s roads. This is in turn clearly linked to the prevalence of low
standards of driver training—both informal and in many driving schools—and
to widespread fraud and corruption in our driving licence testing and issuing
system.
[The Driving Licence Testing Inspectorate currently estimates that up to
50% of all licences currently entered into the Driving Licence Register may be
licences issued or obtained in an irregular manner].
The short-term strategy tackles all these issues head on.
INTRODUCING THE DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERT (DRE) PROGRAMME
IN SA
Following on from a successful pilot project run by the CSIR and the
SAPS from Oct 1999 to Feb 2000, programmes are now being prepared for the
training of a viable number of Drug Recognition Experts in South Africa,
to enable law enforcement agencies to begin scientifically screening &
prosecuting drug impaired drivers.
The SA DRE Programme will be closely modelled on the methodology
developed by the Los Angeles Police Dept, supported by the Southern
California Research Institute. This is now in use in 34 states in the USA
as well as in Canada, having successfully withstood numerous legal
challenges casting doubt on the evidentiary reliability of the screening
& testing methods in use.
The importance of going down this route in South Africa was clearly
demonstrated during the pilot project, when the Drug Recognition Expert
found that of the total number of 54 detainees who (voluntarily)
participated in the project, roughly 63% tested as impaired by alcohol,
54% by dagga, 30% by Mandrax, 2% by LSD, and 6% by opiates (in various
combinations).
Though driving under the influence of drugs is already an offence, we
are now for the first time in a position to start addressing the problem
systematically, and with good prospects of successful prosecution. |
Other human factors include:
Pedestrian road use
South Africa’s hybrid first world-third world economy and infrastructure
are sharply reflected in an extremely high rate of vehicle-pedestrian collisions
and fatalities, as is illustrated by the graphic below.

In crashes involving pedestrians, jaywalking and walking under the influence
of alcohol or drugs are the major contributory factors, being present in 40 to
50% of vehicle-pedestrian collisions in urban areas and in 30 to 40% in rural
areas.
Enforcement focused on pedestrian behaviour contributing to collisions will
be increased during the life of this strategy. Such enforcement will be
carefully targeted as part of our broader approach to pedestrian safety, which
also highlights continuous audits of hazardous locations, low cost engineering
and signage upgrades, improved land use planning and sustained school and
community education and participation programmes.
Vehicle fitness factors include:
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Under-inflated tyres;
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Smooth or worn tyres or fitting the wrong types of tyres;
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Poor brakes;
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Faulty steering;
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Poor lights/vehicle visibility;
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Poor general maintenance of other vehicle parts such as the chassis,
body, wheel alignment and shock absorbers.
Operator fitness factors include:
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(Over)loading of passengers and freight vehicles used for commercial
purposes;
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Management of vehicles (maintenance, safety and quality assurance
regimes) and drivers (qualifications, refresher training, medical fitness,
fatigue etc.)
Road environment factors include:
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Poor maintenance of the road surface, resulting in potholes and poor ride
quality;
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Poor maintenance of the road reserve and/or road verges - e.g. tall grass
at junctions obscuring oncoming vehicles, broken fences allowing cattle and
other domestic animals to stray onto roads, and poor maintenance of gravel
shoulders;
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Inadequate signs and markings.
ROAD ACCESS MANAGEMENT AND SPECIAL NEEDS CUSTOMERS
Road Access Management (RAM)
RAM is an internationally proven formal methodology for improving
traffic safety, increasing traffic capacity and maximising road system
efficiency.
Over the past two years, in cooperation with the US Institute of
Transportation Engineers, our own Committee of Transport Officials (COTO)
has been working with a group of transport planners, traffic and road
design engineers, town and regional planners, transport and urban
economists and legal advisers to develop a set of National Guidelines and
Regulations for Road Access Management in South Africa.
Implementation is expected to begin in late 2001/early 2002, after the
sign-off of the Guidelines and Proposed Regulations document at a
National Symposium presided over by the Minister of Transport on 18
October 2001.
Special Needs Customers
In Moving South Africa-The Action Agenda, we recognised the
urgent need to overcome a historical legacy of generalised disregard for
public transport-dependent special needs customers - the disabled, the
illiterate, scholars, pregnant women and the aged - further compounded by
hostility towards the marginalised majority of our citizens. It took the
position that a 3-pronged approach was required to start unwinding this
legacy:
- Focussing investment in the public transport core strategic networks
so as to create a viable platform for differentiated access planning
and service provision within the mainstream public transport system;
- Capturing opportunities in the general recapitalisation programme
(rail, bus, minibus taxi and roads infrastructure) to enhance vehicle
accessibility and roadside safety; and
- Consciously creating special needs customer empowerment mechanisms
and structures.
Much remains to be done to start putting flesh on the bones of this
general vision. However, important steps have already been taken via:
- The inclusion of detailed vehicle access specifications in the
tender for minibus taxi recapitalisation;
- The prioritisation of special needs issues in the multi-disciplinary
processes of RAM planning and pedestrian safety assurance; and
- The emphasis placed in the present document on organised and
empowered community participation in safe access provision.
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