AN OPERATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY FOR EAST AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

1. The Republic of South Africa Cabinet meeting held on 16 February 2011 emphasised the importance of maritime security, stating that "Cabinet noted the increasing threat of piracy in South African waters and agreed to explore initiatives aimed at assisting Somalia to counter some of the root causes of piracy. It further supported the implementation of the Eastern and Southern African-Indian Ocean (EAS-IO) strategy to combat piracy along the coast of Somalia and the greater Southern African waters. The Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Ms. Lindiwe Sisulu will take the lead in developing a strategy to address the threat of piracy in Southern African waters for consideration by Cabinet – a strategy that will focus on South Africa’s stance in relation to stabilising the political situation in Somalia; the legislative framework dealing with criminals involved in piracy; the positioning and strengthening of South African (SA) naval forces' capacity in relation to the continent and other countries and co-opting assistance from neighbouring countries”.

2. The importance of the sea is an oft-cited notion, and it is readily acknowledged that sea dependence is increasing, both globally, and regionally within the African context. A brief consideration of trade and industrial trends readily demonstrates this – some 90% of trade emanating from, or destined for, the Continent of Africa, is moved by sea1. This represents a considerable source of revenue – a fact not un-noticed by unscrupulous elements such as piracy and criminal syndicates.

3. The maritime trade routes around the coastline of Africa as well as the region’s maritime resources, which could contribute towards sustained development, are threatened by a lack of maritime security. Due to Africa’s strategic position in the globe, this lack of maritime security threatens international maritime trade and has a noticeable impact on security, economic development and ultimately on national security. The importance of the sea must not be underestimated and it is vital that the political masters of our states are made aware of the need to invest in capabilities to fill the gaps in these un-patrolled waters.

4. Many Regional states especially Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states are barely able to maintain navies or coast guards for policing territorial waters, alone being able to develop a naval force that can secure their waters beyond the continental shelf. If the SADC’s maritime environment is to be made safe and secure, a strategy needs to be developed which encompasses a cooperative maritime security approach; hence the need for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the SADC EEZ and a concerted focus on how the navies of the SADC, as a collective, can enhance cooperation and information sharing to ensure a safe maritime zone. Individually, achieving MDA is a daunting task to accomplish, but collectively, this objective is able to be realised.

5. The Chief of the South African Navy, Vice-Admiral Mudimu, in opening the Maritime Conference in Cape Town on 13 October 2009, echoed the importance of overall security

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1 “Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy” Draft Publication: African Union” March 2010
of the Indian Ocean when he indicated that “the security bar at sea would have to be raised to ensure a safer and freer working environment”.2 He further noted that: “for the SA Navy to be victorious in the fight against drug smuggling and piracy and whose activities are becoming a huge threat on a daily basis, there has to be improvement in cooperation within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and other African nations.”3

6. During a meeting held on the 7th March 2011 between the C Navy, C SAAF, C Def Intelligence, GOC Spec Forces and various senior staff members it was decided to commence mapping a strategy to counter the increasing threat to Maritime Security in East Africa.

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DEFINITIONS

8. Proceeding from the broad definitions provided by Rahman4 (2009) this proposal, in addressing Maritime Security, will reflect upon the following dimensions:

   a. **Matter of Ocean Governance and the establishment of a Stable Maritime Regime.** This dimension has as its focus matters of governance and management. The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, the (Safety Of Life At Sea) SOLAS Convention and MARPOL are seen as providing the regulatory context within this perspective, with ocean governance, defined as “the creation and implementation of the rules and practices to govern ocean uses and users”5 serving as reference point.

   b. **Military Activities at Sea.** This dimension addresses specifically matters of common security.6 This element has, in the past, addressed itself to the matter of arms limitation and control of naval forces. This has been easier in concept than in application, and the practical implementation thereof has been confounded by a number of factors. Delimitation of artillery and heavy weaponry is somewhat easier than that of naval assets and capabilities. First, Naval assets are highly expensive commodities and they cannot simply be traded away/reduced in order to support control measures. Second, the oceans are obviously relatively borderless, and naval assets are highly mobile. Implementing arms control measures to restrict their use to one operational theatre is neither practical nor viable. Third, naval postures and strategic capabilities and limitations between various countries and regions are highly asymmetrical. While some countries have adopted a landward focus, others have sought to capitalise their maritime forces more highly.

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3 Ibid p. 15


5 Ibid: 32.

6 Ibid: 36.
Further, even within the maritime force component, different countries have adopted different strength orientations, e.g., submarines versus surface fleets. As such, strategic arms control would be viewed by some with high degrees of approbation. Finally, Naval assets are highly flexible, able to execute a broad range of capabilities. Thus while war-fighting might be a key component of their capability, these platforms have a number of other inherent uses, spanning the full gamut of activities, including humanitarian support, diplomacy, search and rescue and constabulary functions. Delimiting capabilities through arms control would be complex, if not impossible.7

c. **Regulation of Maritime Transport.** The regulation of Maritime Transport through regulations and conventions has enjoyed increasing prominence subsequent to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America, creating an awareness of the vulnerability of transportation routes to terrorism. Prior to this time, security of transportation routes had been largely unregulated, with the exception of the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention). A number of amendments to existing Conventions were introduced, with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) promulgating such measures as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, and a number of new Protocols to the SUA Convention, as well as provisions for a satellite based long range identification and tracking (LRIT) of SOLAS-regulated vessels.8 Thus, the post-September 2001 period has seen the introduction of a number of tools orientated at addressing security of transportation routes, identified under the auspices of Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention. These have included such tools as the Ship Automatic Identification System and the satellite based LRIT. It is likely that the role of the IMO in addressing security of transportation routes is likely to expand, given the credibility that this body enjoys throughout the world.

d. **Maritime Security.** In the context of this strategy, maritime security entails security from crimes at sea, maritime resource security and security of seafarers in all the maritime zones and the high seas in national and international waters and in the territorial waters of other nations where the requisite Memoranda of Understanding are in place.

e. **Maritime Security Operations.** Maritime Security Operations are maritime operations conducted for the purposes ensuring maritime security. These operations will thus include operations against piracy, illegal arms proliferation, criminality, human trafficking, drug trafficking, illegal smuggling, pollution, toxic waste dumping and illegal fishing.

f. **Maritime Domain.** Maritime domain refers to “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.” Maritime Domain Awareness is “a collection, fusion and dissemination of enormous quantities of data – intelligence and information - drawn from joined

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7 Ibid: 37.
8 Ibid: 41.
forces, government agencies, international coalition partners and forces, and commercial entities”.

g. Maritime Area of Operations. Maritime Area of Operations refers to the RSA and SADC maritime space with specific reference to East Africa, and includes the entire maritime space of the Mozambique Channel and the Eastern part of Madagascar.

MARITIME THREAT ANALYSIS OF THE EAST AFRICAN COAST

9. Introduction. In deriving a maritime threat analysis of the East African littoral region, the factors considered relevant to this strategy are armed piracy, crime, lack of domain awareness, and the ineffective legal framework.

10. Maritime Power Vacuum. A maritime power vacuum exists along the East Africa coast – countries along the coast have little or no maritime assets to enforce maritime security in their territorial waters, let alone the high seas. States along the East Africa coast have largely addressed themselves to land-focused issues, and maritime forces are generally fledgling in both size and capability. The operational state and availability of states' maritime assets is also low. In addition, the East Africa coast encompasses a vast coastline that requires a number of maritime assets in order to enforce maritime security. The lack of maritime power along this coastline may increasingly create a breeding ground for piracy, terrorism and international criminal organisations. The SAN is the most capable navy in the region and states along the East Africa coast are very dependent on the SAN to provide assets for maritime security. Adequate and capable SAN assets will therefore be cardinal to the implementation of maritime security. If pirate groups and/or maritime crime syndicates have established “forward bases” within SADC littoral states (especially along the Mozambican and Tanzanian coasts), South Africa must assist governments of affected countries to close such bases in order to deter the use thereof.

11. Armed Piracy. Armed piracy figures most prominently in the contemporary security discourse on the Indian Ocean and trends show an increase in piracy in the Indian Ocean during the coming decades. Incidents of armed piracy have increased extensively and are no longer only found in areas off Somalia, but have expanded to the Mozambique channel.

12. Crime Syndication. Crime syndication, which includes smuggling of weapons, drugs and other illegal substances', as well as human trafficking are a significant threat to maritime security off the East Africa coast. It is readily apparent that the routes selected to transport these illicit goods is not necessarily the most direct route; rather the goods are transported via the routes of least resistance – in other words via weak states where under-resourcing characterises law-enforcement. Some 60% of human trafficking took place in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the profits generated by these activities are significant, making any combating thereof extremely difficult. The impact of such trafficking is further compounded by the fact that payment by producers to local communities is often in the form of drugs, with the resultant negative impact on social well-being and cohesion of communities themselves.

13. Lack of Maritime Domain Awareness. The integrated processes required to establish and maintain a degree of Maritime Domain Awareness, as well as intelligence co-operation and the ability to compile a common operational picture, does not exist along the East African coast. In addition, command, control and communication systems required for maritime co-operation, as well as for communication within shore bases, do
not exist. In the spirit of cooperative engagement it may be wise to establish a SADC multinational anti-piracy centre to coordinate activities in the Southern African region. This could possibly be based on the existing MSCHOA and UKMTO models, and could eventually link into these centres in the form of an intelligence exchange program. A voluntary merchant ship reporting system, in cooperation with SAMSA must be established as a base for reporting ANY maritime piracy/criminal incidents. Vessels thus operating within SADC waters (or at least transiting through the Mozambique Channel) must be encouraged to report unlawful activity. The common operational picture is informed by physical, electronic, communication and signal data and information.

14. Continental/Regional Legal Framework. There is currently a paucity of effective continental/regional framework to address maritime security issues.

OPERATIONAL STRATEGY: SPECIAL FORCES CONTRIBUTION

15. CONOPS. Special Forces will assist the appointed force Commander in the execution of his core function.

a. **Shaping the Battle Space.** Prior to deployment of the main force Special Forces can supply overt, clandestine and covert intelligence gathering capabilities to enhance DI intelligence. The information thus obtained can be used to compile Tactical Area Studies (TAS) of potential deployment areas for use during later operations. It will also serve to acquaint Special Forces with the terrain and conditions of the Battle Space. During this time Special Forces can also link up with identified SADC partners to train and enhance local capabilities to build capacity in the region, and obtain local knowledge. By using local forces language and cultural barriers can be overcome. A long-lasting capability can also be established in this manner.

b. **Finding the Adversary.** During this stage of the operation Special Forces can assist other Services and Divisions to locate the known pirate mother ships in SADC waters and beyond. By applying the latest technology trackers can be attached to these ships to enable DI to track these ships with hourly accuracy. The presence of these mother ships in SADC waters can thus be determined and further actions can be planned in detail. Special Forces, in conjunction with SADC partners, can also conduct clandestine and landward reconnaissance to determine potential pirate hide outs, infrastructure and lines of communication.

c. **Fixing the Adversary.** In order to fix the Adversary Special Forces can supply the Force Commander with an array of capabilities to determine the most advantageous time and location for interdiction.

d. **Destroying/Neutralising the Adversary.** In order to deter the scourge of piracy from affecting the economies of SADC nations Special Forces offensive capabilities can be used to destroy/neutralise/interdict Adversary main equipment, infrastructure, leadership and lines of communication. Through the use of technology both offensive and non-offensive methods may be employed. The focus of main effort will be to render useless the Adversary capability to roam freely in SADC waters.

e. **Exploit Success.** Once this has been achieved Special Forces can resort to training of local Special Forces to ensure a localised capacity to deal with
the problem in the long term, leaving them free to focus on other areas of priority.

OPERATIONAL STRATEGY (PREPARATORY PHASE)

16. **Introduction.** Before forces deploy into the area of operations the SANDF must be fully prepared to be able to sustain them and operate them effectively in the area. This is particularly important in the context of multi-national security operations. It is also important given the potential threats, the dangers they pose and the vast expanses of ocean areas that forces will operate in. The paragraphs below list a number of the factors that need to be considered in this regard.

17. **Capability Gap for Patrol and Surveillance of the Maritime Space.** There is a serious capability gap (Urgent Strategic Enablers) to conduct sustained patrols and surveillance of the Maritime Space, as well as the command and control required to establish Maritime Domain Awareness. The Urgent Strategic Enablers are indicated in Appendix A, and are briefly indicated below.

   a. Ocean Patrol Capability.

   b. Inshore and Harbour Patrol Capability.

   c. Maritime Air Surveillance Capability.

   d. Maritime Domain Awareness with in-theatre Command and Control Capability.

   e. Maritime Helicopter Sustainment Capability.

18. **Supplementary Budget.** The proposed maritime security operations are not funded under the present operating budget. In addition, the increased tempo of operations will increase the maintenance burden and cost of deployed platforms and associated equipment. A supplementary budget will be required to make the operations possible and sustain them in the long run. To this end, the Presidential Employment Papers must include the necessary budget (See Appendix B).

19. **Improved Situational Awareness.** The preparation strategy requires persistent Situational Awareness in the Area of Operations (AOO), ideally allowing for a tactical picture which includes knowledge of every vessel operating in the AOO. In order to achieve the required level of situational awareness it will be necessary to be linked in with intelligence provided by international organisations such as SHADE (Shared Awareness and De-confliction) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as well as having access to MERCURY, which provides information on pirate activity. SHADE and MERCURY are both internet based and are easily accessible once a country has been allowed to join the network. The SANDF has been invited to join SHADE and should take up this offer as excellent intelligence as well as operational information can be gained. The SANDF should also apply to join Mercury (possibly through the French). This should be done within the next two months.

20. **Maritime Domain Awareness Center (MDAC).** This proposal considers the MDAC as a critical SANDF capability to provide situational awareness in the AOO. In addition, through JOPS (MCC) it will also provide command and control for assigned maritime, air and land forces for maritime security of East Africa with specific focus on the Mozambique Channel. The MDAC is also considered to be the key component of a future
National Maritime Security Centre and a future Regional Maritime Security Centre (RMSC) with links to other regional maritime security organisations and with the requisite Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability in place. To ensure integration of the air space domain in the AOO, the regimental air defence operational centre (RADOC) must be integrated into the MDAC. The RADOC would provide an air picture and tactical command and control for air defence. Interfaces for the COASTRAD system must be included. Air picture compilation will require the projects related to air defence systems be expedited.

21. **Robust Legal Framework.** In order for the Operational Maritime Security Strategy to function properly, it is an absolute necessity that a robust legal framework exists that will allow for the management of a broad range of maritime security threats. One solution to the difficulties associated with prosecuting for piracy is, therefore, to find an alternative means of bringing criminal charges against those involved. The solution in many cases may well be to employ the **2005 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)** rather than to prosecute for piracy as such. Fortunately, in the case of Somali piracy, all of the incidents that have occurred so far seem to be consistent with such an approach. Other international conventions of relevance and applicability include the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. State parties to these three conventions should have enabling domestic legislation in place to give effect to their provisions. Instead of prosecuting for piracy, the obvious way to proceed is to use that legislation as a basis for prosecution. In relation to jurisdiction, there are essentially four prosecution options.

a. **Option One.** The apprehending warship transfers those charged with piracy to courts in their own state. Some have indeed done this, with pirates finding themselves in Europe and the US for prosecution.

b. **Option Two.** This option is to land pirates to Somalia and Puntland for prosecution – the territory from which they operate. Given the political and administrative circumstances ashore there, this has not been a seriously likely option so far.

c. **Option Three.** This option is to land those apprehended to another state in the region for prosecution. This is the most strongly favoured option and agreements were reached in late 2008 and early 2009 to transfer detainees to Kenyan jurisdiction for process. Although convenient, this is not ideal, and Kenya has not yet proved to be an efficient solution to the problem.

d. **Option Four.** A final option might be to set up a special court in the region to prosecute pirates. While this might sound an appropriate way forward, it is not favoured by the interested parties to date. Apart from the fact that it is not necessary, the creation of another international tribunal for this specific purpose would most likely prove to be an expensive and overly bureaucratic solution. The already established International Criminal Court (ICC) is not an option because the crime of piracy does not fall within its jurisdiction and it is most unlikely that the Rome Statute of the Court could now be modified to include it without extensive renegotiation.

22. Sustaining Maritime Security in the AOO will require a SADC/Multi-national effort. Consequently, it is recommended that a special court be established in the region to prosecute criminal activities and piracy at sea. Seychelles has indicated an initial
willingness establish such a regional special court.

23. It is thus imperative that bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with all the countries in the Area of Operations (preferably containing the same agreements regarding maritime security) are available, in date and authorised. It is furthermore imperative that Presidential Employment Papers delineating the extent of the maritime security operations required are signed and made available to the operational commanders. It is also of utmost importance to ensure that the necessary processes for proper and effective legal action in terms of Domestic Law are in place. In this regard it is especially important to ensure that there is an effective process for handing over of arrested criminals (or pirates) and the evidence collected, to an appropriate authority and that the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) accepts responsibility for the prosecution of arrested criminals and that, where necessary, special courts are set up in order to dispense justice fairly and swiftly. This requirement will necessitate “buy-in” from the Department of Justice. Once all of these legal instruments are in place, comprehensive Rules of Engagement (ROE), properly in line with these legal instruments, must be drawn up, approved by Chief of joint Operations on behalf of CSANDF and issued by the MCC at the Operational Headquarters to the responsible OTC. ROE must be promulgated by the OTC to all personnel under his/her command.

24. **Force Requirements.** The integrated force requirements include all or combinations of the following Force Structure Elements (FSEs):

   a. **Maritime.**

      i. Frigate/s with embarked Lynx helicopters, Maritime Reaction Squadron (MRS) boarding team, legal advisor, SAMHS capability, Military Police Agency (MPA) capability, and Special Forces (SF) opposed boarding team.

      ii. Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs).

      iii. Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPVs) and harbour patrol boats.

      iv. Submarines.

      v. A forward deployed naval logistics support capability.

      vi. A forward deployed MRS protection force and shore base capability to support the FOB.

      vii. A Maritime Legal Advisory Team.

   b. **Air.**

      i. Maritime Surveillance and EW Aircraft with SIGINT/ESM/COMINT, FLIR, Radar and the Argos FLIR capabilities.

      ii. Oryx transport helicopter/s (capable of bounce refuelling from a Frigate and Combat Search and Rescue).

      iii. A109 helicopters with command and control and IR illumination capability.
iv. Forward deployed MSA support team.

v. Medium Air Transport aircraft to ensure sustainment flights to and from the area of operations.

vi. Light Reconnaissance aircraft fitted with the Argos FLIR facility.

vii. Light Utility Helicopter fitted with the Argos FLIR facility.

viii. A Tactical Intelligence Unit.

ix. A Tactical Airfield Unit.

c. **Land.**

i. SA Army domain awareness assets such as SIGINT/ESM, Shore-based radars, UAVs and Communication/Data Transfer Systems.

ii. Special Forces reconnaissance team/s ashore.

iii. A forward deployed command and control capability.

iv. A forward deployed Military Police Agency capability (if required).


vi. **Geospatial assets.** This includes Defence Intelligence for strategic and operational level geospatial support, the SA Army for tactical level mapping, the SAAF for tactical level image interpretation and visual reconnaissance, and the SA Navy for hydrography, rapid environmental assessment and weather predictions.

vii. The following Military Health facilities are required:

1. Level One (minus) which consists of a minor ailment post combined with a resuscitation post. Pre-deployment health assessment to be conducted at the home unit.

2. Medical Logistics Section.

3. CASEVAC capability from deployed maritime forces to the FOB for onward transit to Hoedspruit if required.

25. **Forward Positioning.** The preparation strategy requires some FSEs to be forward deployed as indicated by the aforementioned force requirements. The requirement for the forward deployed elements will be dependent on the exact content and detail of the MOU in place for the country to which it is intended to pre-deploy and on the exact detail of the Presidential Employment Papers for a specific operation.

26. **Special Forces Contribution to the Preparatory Phase.** In the execution of the Operational Level functions the Commander can rely on Special Forces to provide the following support during the Preparatory Phase.

a. **Shaping of the Battle Space.** As discussed in paragraph 15 above.
b. Finding the Adversary. As in paragraph 15 above. This activity will however continue throughout the life-cycle of the Operation.

c. Intelligence Collection. As the operation progresses Special Forces can be employed to satisfy EEI in conjunction with other Intelligence Agencies, and thus contribute to an improved situational awareness.

d. Mission-Readiness Training. In order to comply with the Special Forces requirement for rehearsals prior to the execution of operations, preparations for the operation will start with immediate effect. If the necessary authority can be obtained, selected SADC Special Forces partners can also be pulled in to enhance their capacity.

e. Forward Positioning. To achieve the objective of forward positioning special Forces can conduct mission readiness training in the selected SADC countries to provide a foot on the ground for the Force Commander, gain local knowledge and build capacity amongst local forces. It is essential that these actions are initiated as soon as possible after clearance at the highest political level.

27. Mission Readiness Training. The joint force assembled, specific to the particular mission, must undergo mission readiness training as a joint force before the commencement of the mission. Compliance to ROE must be exercised as part of mission readiness training. Mission readiness training can be exercised en route to the mission area or once the joint force is assembled in the mission area. Dependent on the corporate communications strategy, mission readiness training in the mission area can be used as part of a “show of force” for the purposes of deterrence, in order to enhance the success of the mission, where applicable.

28. Corporate Communications. Corporate communications is essential to the success of the mission and must be viewed as such. In this regard it is essential that the corporate communications strategy is planned and aligned with the desired outcome of the mission as part of the mission planning process. The corporate communications plan must be aligned with both government intent and the requirements of the operation and when necessary a compromise must be reached. Because of the diversity of languages in the area (Portuguese, French, Swahili, English, Somali, Arabic, etc) an appropriate language translation team would be required as part of the FOB. The corporate communications strategy must be clearly delineated in the Chief of Joint Operations Directive.

29. Maritime Area of Operations. As piracy has become more prevalent in SADC waters, it would be prudent to conduct operations within SADC waters, and in doing so South Africa will be protecting national and regional interests more directly. This area is to include the EEZ’s of Mozambique, Tanzania, Madagascar and the Seychelles covering an area of approximately 3,38 million square kilometres (does not include Comoros EEZ). The inclusion of the non SADC state of the Comoros should also be considered as it falls within the AOO. The map below gives an indication of distances by sea between Mozambique. Tanzania, Madagascar and the Seychelles.
30. **Command Concepts.** The SA Navy will be the lead organisation for all operations executed at or from the sea. The following command concepts for "chopped forces" is applicable:

   a. **Operational Command.** Operational Command for the envisaged missions will remain with Chief of Joint Operations on behalf of CSANDF.

   b. **Operational Control.** The Operational Headquarters will be charged with Operational Control for the envisaged missions. This will be vested in the Maritime Component Commander (MCC), as appointed by the SA Navy, for the maritime operation. The location of the MCC would be dependent on the nature of the operation at sea. The 'maritime operation' is regarded to include all military tasks executed at sea, coastal islands and the land area.
adjacent to the coast.

c. **Tactical Command.** The Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) will be the officer delegated with tactical command of the maritime force. Depending on the size of the maritime force this authority could also be vested in the Officer Commanding.

31. **Support Concept.** FSEs will provide direct support to the OTC as ordered for the successful completion of the mission. FSEs will be supported administratively and logistically or by their respective Level 2 and 3 Headquarters (or as arranged during the mission planning process), as required, by the Operational Headquarters through the MCC. The MCC will be supported by a conveniently located, Forward Deployed Support Element, equipped with the required command and control capability, tailored to the mission, from which necessary support, including force protection, will be provided through liaison with the relevant Headquarters, local authorities and appointed agents.

32. **Permanent Partnerships and Liaison.** The OTC must be provided with an embarked legal advisor from the Defence Legal Service, conversant with all relevant aspects of the Law of Armed Conflict, International Law of the Sea and Domestic Law. The legal advisor must, in turn, be provided with legal support from the Operational Headquarters. The OTC must be further provided with the necessary support from experts in other government departments or from other governments as required for the specifics of the mission, for example, Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) for fishery protection, the local Police Service for criminal activity in the Territorial Sea and Customs and Excise officials for violations in the Contiguous Zone. Whenever necessary, the OTC must further be provided with embarked Maritime Intelligence support. The embarked Maritime Intelligence Officer must have direct liaison and support from Defence Intelligence and must have established partnerships and links into intelligence resources from other governments and other mission specific international operations such as those established for anti-piracy operations such as SHADE. The OTC must also be provided with the necessary links and embarked support from other governments with whom the mission is being coordinated.

33. **Special Forces Contribution to the Execution Phase.** In the execution of the Operational Level functions the Commander can rely on Special Forces to provide the following support during the Execution Phase.

a. **Command, Control and Planning Ability.** Acting under Operational Control of the Force Commander Special Forces can conduct independent, joint and combined operations to achieve the selected aim. In order to achieve this it is imperative that the Special Forces Component Commander form an integral part of the Command structure from the onset. This appointed Special Forces Commander will advise the Force Commander about potential Special Forces actions and will execute direct control over deployed Special Force elements. For this purpose Special Forces will require the deployment of a Special Forces Tactical Headquarters in addition to the Main Operational Headquarters. This will serve to satisfy the unique Special Forces Command and Control arrangements, provide specialised communication to deployed elements, enable the detail planning of Special Forces operations and deal with Special Forces unique combat search and rescue requirements. This Headquarters will also plan and sustain deployed forces in terms of Special Forces unique logistic requirements.
b. **Sustainment.** Special Forces will fall in with the generic admin and log arrangements of the operation at large whilst making provision for unique requirements. By training local forces Special Forces will also be able to sustain the operation by means of man power over an extended period of time. Unique tactical technology requirements will be satisfied by means of the Special Forces Research, Evaluation and Development capability (RED). Sustainment of elements deployed beyond the area of operations can be conducted in conjunction with the SAAF, SAN and Army Air Supply capabilities.

c. **Unique Special Forces Communications.** Special Forces will supply its own unique command and control CMI infrastructure and where necessary make this available to the Force Commander. Special Forces can also assist in achieving signal inter-operability with local forces by providing technology solutions at a tactical level.

d. **Mobility, Movement and Manoeuvre.** Through its’ own unique equipment Special Forces can provide the Force Commander with additional rapid reaction manoeuvre elements. This can be applied in the landward, riverine and maritime environments. It will afford the Force Commander the ability to execute operations with stealth and surprise. For strategic transport Special Forces will rely heavily on SAAF and SAN capabilities.

e. **Firepower.** Special Forces unique firepower will enhance the Force Commanders’ ability to neutralise the adversary’s capabilities.

f. **Force Protection.** Special Forces will be able to provide its own elements with the necessary means to protect itself. In extreme conditions it can also be relied upon to protect elements of the larger force.

34. **Command and Signal.** For the Maritime Security Operations envisaged by this Strategy the SA Navy should always be directed by Chief of Joint Operations to function and execute the duties of the MCC. In order for the SA Navy to execute the MCC function effectively it will be necessary for the SA Navy to establish a proper Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability which will function along similar lines to the Air Force Command Post and the 43 & 46 Brigade Headquarters. The MDA capability will require the necessary ICT-infrastructure to ensure intelligent manoeuver (discussed below) of maritime forces by the MCC that have been assigned for Maritime Security Operations. Establishing an MDA capability will enable the SA Navy to provide a proper naval command and control capability to Chief of Joint Operations for Maritime Force Employment activities. The Signal support concept is based on the premise that the RSA (SANDF) will provide Signal support to deployed forces as pledged. The RSA FSEs, as part of the force, will utilise the embedded telecommunications for the duration of the operation. A signal support element will be provided to sustain the RSA telecommunications component as a whole. The Interoperability must be defined prior to deployment of forces. Reliable signal support will enable the MCC to execute effective command and control for the duration of the operation made possible by the deployment of the Composite Signal elements that will support on Strategic, Operational and Tactical level. Telecommunication security will be applied in accordance with ISS governance. The Signal Concept is supported by the following capabilities:

a. **Tactical Communications.** The provision of Tact COMCEN bmo a Rapid
Deployment container/Samil 50 TG vehicle (Depending on mode of transport available). This includes the HF rear link back to J Ops, internal HF/VHF/UHF communications, ground to air communications, and generators for own power needs and back-up in the tactical environment.

b. **Command and control telecommunication support.** Satellite Systems must be available to support the operation. The system must be able to provide data, speech, DSN, Lotus Notes, facsimile capability, OSIS/CALMIS/patient administration/PERSOL, and a Red-Line capability. Alternative options will need to be exploited to enable services such as encrypted e-mail, and internet for access to MERCURY and SHADE.

c. **Electronic Warfare (EW).** 5 Signal Regiment Static EW environment will be required to support the operation, tasking will be conducted via Defence Intelligence. The tactical EW systems can be deployed on Ship and Ashore. Utilisation of Kosi Bay is to be formalised.

d. **Power supply and reticulation.** SA Army Signal Formation will be required to provide reticulation and lighting systems in the deployed base areas.

e. **Telecommunications Repair and Signal Logistics Support.** Deployed forces are to have a field workshop capability and a M&R support by local industry. Ten percent pool levels are to be maintained during the operation.

35. **Intelligence Manoeuvre.** Efficient intelligence manoeuvre operations are required for the effective conduct of the maritime security operations. As such, excellent and up to date maritime intelligence is required in order to manoeuvre naval and air assets into the “right place at the right time”. Maritime intelligence of the quality required for efficient intelligence based manoeuvre operations will require that the aforementioned situational awareness and the fused picture derived from it, are of the highest quality and accuracy. The importance of accurate and reliable maritime intelligence cannot be over emphasised.

**OPERATIONAL STRATEGY (SUSTAINMENT PHASE)**

36. **Introduction.** The challenges of insecurity in the East Coast African littorals are likely to endure for a number of years. For this reason, forces will need to be sustained in theatre for a considerable period of time, requiring a rigorous sustainment plan to support the strategy. Cognisance must be taken of the following sustainment factors.

37. **Special Forces Contribution to the Sustainment Phase.** In the execution of the Operational Level functions the Commander can rely on Special Forces to provide the following support during the Sustainment Phase.

a. **Forward Operating Base.** If so required Special Forces can provide the equipment for its own forward operating base in the operational area. This can be done independently or in conjunction with the main forward operating base. For security reasons Special Forces, however, require an isolated location to protect its unique capabilities.

b. **Logistical Support.** Special Forces will supply its own unique logistics in addition with the generic force logistics. This will be done on the normal sustainment channels.
c. **Rotation.** Due to its small size Special Forces force levels have to remain flexible in order reduce or reinforce specific actions. During periods of low intensity Special Forces will focus on mission readiness training, training of local forces and Intelligence gathering. In the lead up to offensive actions or force levels will be increase/rotated to ensure that the right people are available for operations. It must be understood on all levels that Special Forces must maintain the ability to rotate personal out of sequence with the main force to ensure that it can meet its other operational commitments.

d. **Multi National Contribution.** In order to build capacity in the region Special Forces will, if so authorised, train identified SADC Special Forces to enhance their future ability to operate independently. Equipping these forces will be a challenge. International support might have to be requested in this regard. This have to be done within the regulations of the receiving country. The SANDF may wish to contribute to this effort by availing surplus stock to these forces if authorised.

38. **Forward Operating Base.** The concept of a forward operating base (FOB) must be utilised. This base will be in-theatre, and situated in a suitable location (e.g. Pemba). Because of the large size of the Maritime Area of Operations, satellite stations in the Comoros, Seychelles and Madagascar that offer come lower level of FOB functions may be required to ensure that an effective Domain Awareness Network is established across the Mozambique Channel. The FOB will perform the following functions:

   a. Provide logistic support, utilising a small technical team, a Transportable Logistic Support Unit (TLSU) and shipping agent support.

   b. House a Theatre Command Post (Tactical HQ). To a large extent this will be a “Combined” Tactical HQ.

   c. Serve as an operating base for land-based aircraft involved in the operation.

   d. Serve as a staging area for deploying forces and sustainment flights.

   e. Serve as the base where prisoners are landed to Mozambican authorities.

   f. Serve as a safe storage for weapons and small arms ammunition.

39. **FOB Infrastructure.** The FOB will require C2 infrastructure, technical support infrastructure as well as requisite force protection capability. The method of accommodating and feeding the landward-deployed personnel will have to be carefully considered. While the FOB staff will be a tailored continental system staff, (J1 to J9) the support teams forming part of the FOB will consist of at least the following:

   a. Legal Officers and Military Police.

   b. Public Relations/ media liaison personnel.

   c. Personnel from Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).

   d. Intelligence Functionaries.

   e. Supply, IT and technical support.
40. **In Theatre Logistic Support.** It is important to have substantial logistic support in theatre in order to be able to sustain the forces involved in the operation over an extended period. The FOB concept will go a long way towards enabling this logistic support but the following also needs to be considered:

a. The possibility of deploying SAS DRAKENSBERG (DKBG) into the area for logistic support purposes. The embarkation of ORYX transport helicopters would increase the usefulness of this concept on DKBG.

b. The possibility of using NATO or EUNAVFOR on station tankers for replenishment of fuel for our own vessels.

c. Regular sustainment flights into the FOB area.

d. Blanket ministerial authority for RSA military personnel travelling to and from the operational area.

41. **Rotation.** In order to be able to sustain maritime security operations indefinitely, a coherent rotation plan needs to be established. Careful planning will have to take place in order to ensure that an effective balance of capabilities remains in theatre at all times whilst at the same time ensuring that maintenance, rest recovery and force preparation for the relieving deployment to take place. The following will require consideration:

a. Deploying vessels to the area for a period of 6 to 9 months before relieving them. The deployments should be planned to ensure they take place between scheduled major maintenance periods.

b. Considering rotation of ships crews in-theatre (or variations of this idea).

c. Ensuring execution of first and second line maintenance in-theatre. This includes continued mission training.

d. Establishing a capability to repair operational defects in-theatre.

42. **Strategic Reserves.** Sufficient maritime forces will have to remain in the RSA in order to stand by for various national contingencies, as directed by the Medium Term Force Employment Guidelines. In addition, forces need to be available to replace vessels deployed on East African maritime security operations that suffer severe defects or casualties during their operational deployments. The delivery of PROJECT BIRO offshore patrol vessels (OPVS) will become a critical success factor for continued application of the Operational Strategy for Maritime Security and to ensure the maintenance of a strategic reserve.

43. **Multi-national Contribution.** Multinational cooperation will be aimed at international, regional and the respective littoral states as well as other nations that may be operating in the area (e.g. France). The SANDF must exploit maritime opportunities offered by other maritime nations to supply fuel and other logistic support in the area of operations (e.g., supply support vessels).

**CONCLUSION**

44. The countering of maritime security threats in the South African and East African littoral regions is a Cabinet priority. This will require a focussed and sustained maritime
security effort. In order to achieve the end state of a favourable maritime security situation in the RSA and East African littoral regions, the proposed OPERATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY FOR EAST AFRICA should be adopted. The proposed Operational Strategy consists of three phases (Preparatory, Execution and Sustainment) in order to ensure effective targeting of maritime forces onto identified threats. Underpinning the Operational Strategy are the URGENT STRATEGIC ENABLERS that must be addressed as a matter of priority in order to ensure sustainment, presence and leverage of the maritime space.